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Abstract 
For the 2014 election the Environmental Party, which is a small single issue party, revealed an 
election manifesto for the forthcoming electoral period, where they promised to establish more 
charging spots for electric vehicles and to make electric vehicles more accessible. The aim of 
the study is to examine to what extent investments in green infrastructure are affected by 
Environmental Party representation on a local level. A sharp regression discontinuity design is 
applied where the governing coalition in local councils’ changes discontinuously at 50% of the 
seat shares, to estimate the causal effect of Environmental Party representation on investments 
in green infrastructure. The results show that there is a positive causal effect of Environmental 
Party representation on investments in green infrastructure. However, one key assumption of 
the regression discontinuity design is probably violated, indicating that the governing coalitions 
are not as good as randomly assigned. Thus, the causal interpretation of the results must be 
treated cautiously. Moreover, in order to distinguish if it is Environmental Party representation 
that drives investments in green infrastructure on a local level, other factors such as bargaining 
power should be taken into account. 
iv 
Sammanfattning 
Inför valet 2014 lanserade Miljöpartiet ett valmanifest för den kommande mandatperioden där 
de lovade att etablera fler laddpunkter för elbilar och att öka tillgängligheten av elbilar i Sverige. 
Uppsatsen syftar till att undersöka i vilken utsträckning investeringar i grön infrastruktur 
påverkas av om Miljöpartiet ingår i den styrande koalitionen i Sveriges kommuner. I studien 
används en metod kallad sharp regression discontinuity design för att estimera den kausala 
effekten av att miljöpartiet ingår i den styrande koalitionen på investeringar i grön infrastruktur, 
där makten i kommunfullmäktige ändras diskontinuerligt vid 50 % av andelen platser. 
Resultaten visar att det sannolikt finns en positiv kausal effekt av att Miljöpartiet ingår i den 
styrande koalitionen på investeringar i grön infrastruktur, närmare bestämt investeringar i 
laddpunkter. Resultaten bör emellertid tolkas med viss försiktighet på grund av att ett av 
metodens nyckelantaganden, att de styrande koalitionerna ska vara slumpmässiga, inte är 
uppfyllt. För att kunna avgöra om Miljöpartiets representation i styrande koalitioner driver 
investeringar i grön infrastruktur är det nödvändigt att även inkludera andra faktorer, såsom 
vilken förhandlingskraft Miljöpartiet har inom koalitionen. 
v 
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1 Introduction 
The object of this study is to estimate the causal effect of Environmental Party representation 
on investments in green infrastructure. Swedish municipality councils have a constitutional 
right of self-government and have a large freedom to organize its activities, one of which is the 
responsibility to organize local infrastructure (Sveriges kommuner och landsting, 2019). One 
way to organize local infrastructure, and stimulate investments in green infrastructure, is to 
promote the establishment of charging spots. The municipality can drive the establishment of 
charging infrastructure by making sure that charging spots are established to a sufficient extent 
in streets and parking areas, and in connection with exploitations and land acquisitions 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting, 2017). Investments in charging spots are often financed 
through corporation between municipalities and private investors, i.e. where private investors 
finance the equipment and electrical supply while the municipality provides land. This means 
that the development of charging spots can be affected by the policy of the municipality 
government, even if the charging spots are installed by private investors. 
The political system in Sweden is based on proportional representation, both at a national and 
at a local level, meaning that the seats of the council are proportionately distributed based on 
each party’s vote share. In Sweden, it is unusual that one party holds a majority in the council, 
and in order to obtain majority parties often form coalitions. One of the established parties is 
the Swedish Environmental Party, mainly focusing on environmental policy. For the 2014 
election the Environmental Party revealed an election manifesto for the forthcoming electoral 
period. In the manifesto they promised to establish more charging spots for electric vehicles 
and to make electric vehicles more accessible (Miljöpartiet, 2014). Therefore, it is interesting 
to examine to what extent investments in green infrastructure, in this case investments in 
charging spots for electric vehicles, are affected by Environmental Party representation on a 
municipal level. Due to the Environmental Party’s election manifesto it is also of interest to 
examine if Environmental Party representation at a local level affect the number of registered 
electric vehicles. The research question is: Does Environmental Party representation in majority 
coalitions lead to more investments in green infrastructure at a local level? The study will 
contribute to the academic field of analysing the causal effect of political representation on 
policy outcomes, with specific regard to policy outcomes connected to investments in green 
infrastructure, and should therefore be of interest to politicians, political analysts and those 
concerned in the industry of charging infrastructure and electric vehicles.   
To estimate the causal effect of Environmental Party representation on investments in green 
infrastructure a quasi-experimental setting named sharp regression discontinuity design is 
implemented. The method is characterized by assigning a treatment to a subject, based on 
whether the subject fall above or below a fixed threshold on a rating variable (Lee, et al., 2004). 
Thus, if the subject receives a rating variable equal to or greater than the fixed threshold, the 
subject is assigned to the treatment, causing a discontinuity at the threshold. One institutional 
feature of the election system is that the political power changes discontinuously at 50% of the 
seat shares (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008), thus the fixed threshold is 50% and seat share is the 
forcing variable or assignment variable. The regression discontinuity design is based on the 
assumption that subjects who are just below and above the fixed threshold are on average 
identical to each other, except for the exposure of the treatment. 
Of 290 municipalities in Sweden, 196 had a governing majority coalition after the 2014 
election. Applying a sharp regression discontinuity design requires a municipality to have a 
governing majority coalition, why 94 municipalities with governing minority coalitions have 
been excluded from the sample. The Swedish municipalities are quite similar to each other, 
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which is an attractive feature when estimating the causal effect of party representation on policy 
implementation (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). The municipalities share a common political 
framework and serve the same public purpose, meaning that the political parties and the 
economic outcomes are relatively comparable. A potential weakness with the data set is that 
the panel data set is relatively small, only covering a period of five years. Another weakness 
with the data set is the multi-party feature of the Swedish political system, which sometimes 
leads to a mix of parties in the governing coalition at a local level, i.e. a mix between left- and 
right-wing parties. The sharp regression discontinuity design requires a bipartisan political 
system, thus the question of interest is whether the Environmental Party is represented in the 
governing coalition or not, thereby creating a bipartisan political system. However, this does 
not take into account the bargaining power of the Environmental Party within the governing 
coalition. 
The results show that there is a positive estimated causal effect of Environmental Party 
representation in governing coalitions on investments in green infrastructure, and also on the 
number of registered electric vehicles. Municipalities where the Environmental Party is 
represented in the governing coalition have on average approximately 0.6% more installed 
charging spots per population per unit area than municipalities where the Environmental Party 
is not represented in the governing coalition, thus more investments in green infrastructure. 
Further, municipalities where the Environmental Party is represented in the governing coalition 
have approximately 11% more electric vehicles per population per unit area. The results are 
supported by various specification checks of the estimated model. However, the results need to 
be interpreted with caution, since one of the key assumptions of the regression discontinuity 
design probably is violated, because subjects’ value of the forcing variable may be manipulated 
which means that there is reason to believe that the governing coalitions are probably not as 
good as randomly assigned (Smith, et al., 2017).  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides an overview of the literature regarding 
the causal effect of political representation on policy outcomes. The choice of method and 
model is discussed and presented in section three. The applied data is presented in section four. 
In section five the empirical results are presented and analysed with the use of tables and graphs. 
The results and limitations of the study are then discussed in section six. Section seven include 
concluding remarks.     
3 
2 Literature Review 
To study the causal effect of political representation on policy implementation and economic 
outcomes is relatively new, starting with Lee, et al. (2004). Subsequent research present 
different opinions about what effect political representation has on policy implementation and 
economic outcomes. Studies by Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and Warren (2008) show that 
party representation on a local and middle ground of state government does not affect policy 
outcomes in the U.S. However, studies based on Swedish data, by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) 
and Folke (2014) instead show that there is a causal effect of political representation on policy 
implementation and economic outcomes. 
According to Lee, et al. (2004) there are two different perspectives on what role elections have 
on policy formation, and the aim of their study is to assess which of these views is more 
empirically relevant for the U.S. House of Representatives. Perspective one suggest that voters 
can affect the policy choices of the political candidates’, hence the competition for votes cause 
the political candidates to move policies toward the political centre. According to the second 
perspective voters only elect polices, and elections are only means to decide which candidate’s 
preferred policy will be implemented. In order to examine which of these fundamentally 
different views is more empirically relevant for the U.S. House of Representatives, Lee, et al. 
(2004) estimate the causal effect of political representation on following voting records in the 
U.S. House of Representatives. In order to perform the study, they examine the extent to which 
a democrat holding the seat is more liberal than voting records of winners of elections where a 
republican held the seat. To examine the causal effect of political representation on voting 
records in the U.S. House of Representatives, they use a regression discontinuity design which 
isolate exogenous variation in who has the electoral advantage. This will generate “random 
assignment” of which party holds the seat. One important assumption of the design is that 
districts where either the Republicans or the Democrats barely won are comparable in all other 
ways. The assignment variable is the vote share data (1946-1995). This means that when the 
Democrats’ vote share is equal to or above the 50% threshold, the candidate from the 
Democratic party gets to vote in the U.S. House of Representatives. The outcome variable is 
the average of the roll-call voting records of the winners in the elections, where a higher 
“Americans for Democratic Action” (ADA) score correspond to a more “liberal” voting record. 
The results show that there is a discontinuity at the threshold, which suggest that voters do not 
seem to affect politicians’ choices hence the second perspective is more relevant for describing 
roll call voting patterns of the U.S. House of Representatives. However, if instead, there were 
no jump at the threshold, the first perspective would have been more relevant. The conclusion 
of their study is that political representation has no effect on the elected candidate’s voting 
behaviour, hence candidates with less electoral support do not adopt more moderate positions 
than stronger candidates, when in the House of Representatives. The study by Lee, et al. (2004) 
is primarily interesting since it is an early study where a regression discontinuity design is used 
to examine the causal effect of political representation on elected candidates’ voting patterns in 
the U.S. House of Representatives, using vote share as the assignment variable and a threshold 
of 50%. However, the study does not examine whether or to what extent political representation 
affect policy outcomes. 
Unlike Lee, et al. (2004) who study political partisanship on a federal level, Ferreira and 
Gyourko (2009) examined the effect of political representation on policy outcomes at a local 
level in the U.S.. They apply a regression discontinuity design on 2000 direct mayoral elections 
in over 400 U.S. cities between the years 1950 and 2000. As Lee, et al. (2004), the authors 
compare subjects (e.g. cities) where the Democratic candidate barely won an election with 
subjects where the Democratic candidate barely lost. The study by Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) 
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is the first study of the impact of political representation at a local level in the U.S.. They 
examine the causal effect of political representation on the outcome variables: size of city 
government, composition of local public expenditures, and crime rate. The results show that 
there are no partisan differences in policy outcomes at a local level, and that it has little or no 
impact on the political outcomes whether the mayor is a Democrat or Republican. 
The study by Warren (2008) also examines the impact of political representation, but at a 
middle ground of state government in the U.S.. Warren (2008) implement a regression 
discontinuity design to identify the effect of party representation on some policy outcomes; tax 
burden and minimum wage. The results show that there is little or no causal effect of political 
representation on policy outcomes. These two papers, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and Warren 
(2008), are relevant for this study since they both examine the causal effect of political 
representation on some policy outcomes at a local and middle ground level of government in a 
bipartisan political system. This study however, include other policy outcomes than the studies 
by Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and Warren (2008). 
All of the above mentioned articles regard U.S. elections and the U.S. bipartisan electoral 
system. The article by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), on the other hand, use a data set for Swedish 
local elections, and examine the causal effect of political representation on fiscal and economic 
policies. Since the electoral system in Sweden is based on proportional representation and 
consists of a number of parties, the author looks at the two political blocks in Sweden, the left- 
and right-wing, and thereby treating the Swedish electoral system as bipartisan. By doing so, it 
is possible for the author to implement a regression discontinuity design, because the political 
control changes discontinuously at 50% of the vote shares. This makes it possible to compare 
policy outcomes for those municipalities who’s voting record is just below and just above the 
fixed threshold, assuming they are on average identical to each other, except for the exposure 
of the treatment (e.g. political control). The data set consists of 288 Swedish municipalities over 
a 21-year time period. The results show that there is a causal effect of political representation 
on the outcome variables spending, taxes, and unemployment. To verify the results, the author 
applies three different specification checks to the Regression discontinuity design. The paper 
by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) is relevant to my research since it also studies the Swedish 
electoral system at a local level. However, at a local level there are often mixed political 
coalitions, i.e. coalitions that include parties from both the right-wing and the left-wing blocks. 
This study will use much of the same methodology as the study by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), 
but instead of examining right- and left-wing coalitions the determinant of this study will be 
whether the governing coalition include the Environmental Party or not and use investments in 
green infrastructure as the policy outcome. 
Since Sweden have a proportional representation system with many parties, Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2008) treats the system as bipartisan to examine the causal effect of party representation on 
some policy outcomes. Folke (2014) solves the problem regarding the feature of Sweden’s 
proportional representation system by developing a new methodology, examining the causal 
effect of party representation on immigration policy, environmental policy, and tax policy. A 
proportional representation election system often consists of a number of small and big parties, 
and it is uncertain whether and to what extent individual parties shape policy. Folke (2014) 
states that there is no suitable method for estimating the effect of party representation on policy 
outcomes in this type of election system, but however makes an attempt to fill this methodical 
gap. A common solution to estimate the causal effect is to adopt a regression discontinuity 
design. However, applying this approach to this setting is not possible, as individual parties 
rarely hold a majority of either the vote share nor the seat share. This motivated Folke (2014) 
to develop a new methodological framework, in which identification of the causal effect is 
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based on being close to a threshold for a shift in the seat allocation between parties, instead of 
the threshold for a majority change. To estimate the causal effect of political representation on 
immigration, environmental policy, and tax policy Folke (2014) used a data set of 290 
municipalities over a 20-year time period. The environmental policy outcome is based on an 
environmental ranking of all Swedish municipalities, why it is appropriate to consider the 
environmental ranking as an approximation rather than an absolute measure of the 
environmental policy performance. The indicators used in the ranking include measures of 
sustainable procurement, recycling programs, doing environmental audits, and “green” 
information to the inhabitants. The results show that changes in political representation have a 
large and significant effect on immigration and environmental policy. However, Folke (2014) 
does not find any evidence that changes in political representation affect the municipal tax rate. 
In contrast to Folke (2014), this study examines policy outcomes connected to infrastructure 
and environment. The methodology developed by Folke (2014) is quite new and thus not widely 
used in research. Due to time constraints the simpler methodology by Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2008) will be used in this study. 
To summarize this section, in previous research the regression discontinuity design has been 
used to examine the causal effect of political representation on some policy outcomes, mainly 
economic and fiscal policies. However, Folke (2014) examines the effect on environmental 
policy, but without a factual environmental outcome, rather an approximation outcome. 
Therefore, this study examines the causal effect of political representation on investments in 
green infrastructure in Sweden, using an absolute measure of investments in green 
infrastructure as an outcome variable. This study aims to fill a gap by estimating the causal 
effect of governing coalitions, where the Environmental Party is represented, on investments in 
green infrastructure at a local level in Sweden. 
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3 Method 
In this section the choice of method will be discussed and argued. Then, the features of the 
regression discontinuity design are presented, and finally the model and approaches of the 
design are presented. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
In recent years the regression discontinuity design has become a popular method for identifying 
causal effects (Mattei & Mealli, 2016). The method was developed by Thistlethwaite and 
Campbell (1960), and then developed further by Hahn, et al. (2001), regarding identification 
and estimation. McCrary (2008) presented tests to guarantee validity, and Frölich (2007) 
included the use of covariates. Previous papers in economics have used thresholds such as 
geographical, collage applications and elections (Black, 1999; Van Der Klaauw, 2002; Lee, 
2008).  
Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) used the sharp regression discontinuity design to examine 
the causal effect of scholarships on students’ career ambitions. In the study, the decision on 
whether to award a student with a scholarship or not was primarily based on a test score, where 
the students who scored equal or above a fixed threshold were rewarded the scholarship, while 
students who scored below the fixed threshold were rejected the scholarship. This generated a 
sharp discontinuity in the treatment as a function of the test score. When applying the regression 
discontinuity design, the basic assumption was that students’ who scored just below the 
threshold and students who scored just above the threshold are similar to each other except for 
the treatment, in this case, being awarded a scholarship or not.   
In a sharp regression discontinuity design the probability of receiving the treatment changes 
discontinuously at the threshold, thus the binary treatment variable changes from zero to one at 
the threshold (Lee, et al., 2004). Another approach of the regression discontinuity design is the 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where the probability of receiving the treatment can take 
on any value between zero and one. In the fuzzy design, subjects can be placed in the control 
group when, according to the sharp design, they should have been placed in the treatment group, 
or vice versa, according to their assignment score (Cappelleri & Trochim, 2015), such subjects 
are known as crossovers. Therefore, to obtain an unbiased treatment effect in the fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design, instrumental variables are needed. The fuzzy design is often 
used for cases where the subjects are located close to the threshold. For example, students who 
are not accepted to a specific program due to a test score just below the threshold, may 
successfully argue that they should be assigned to it based on other factors than their assignment 
score.  
Cappelleri & Trochim (2015) argues that misassignment (e.g. crossovers) should be avoided if 
possible. The sharp design will allow the outcome variable to be related to the assignment 
variable, unlike with a fuzzy design, where the outcome variable is related to a certain 
instrument (Van Der Klaauw, 2002). The sharp regression discontinuity design makes it 
relatively easy to estimate the treatment effect, and the results can be illustrated with the use of 
graphical methods. Another advantage over the fuzzy design is that the model of the sharp 
design does not need to be specified, thus it avoids questions regarding which variables to 
include and the functional form of the variables (Hahn, et al., 2001). The sharp regression 
discontinuity design will therefore be implemented in this study. However, there are limitations 
to the sharp regression discontinuity design, because it can only identify the estimated causal 
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effect locally, where the chance of receiving the treatment changes discontinuously, from zero 
to one.  
Another reason for using the sharp regression discontinuity design and not i.e. an ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression is because governing coalitions are not randomly assigned (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2008). Due to voter preferences that are difficult to measure, i.e. that voters may prefer 
different parties or types of government due to factors such as the social environment (e.g. a 
recession) at the time of the election, there is a risk of omitted variables when voters cast their 
votes for parties. Thus, the electoral advantage of a governing coalition is endogenously 
determined, and the assignment variable, 𝑥𝑖, will be correlated to the error term which makes
the estimate of the OLS regression biased. The sharp regression discontinuity design on the 
other hand isolates this exogenous variation in 𝑥𝑖, and this variation can be used to identify the
causal effect of  𝑥𝑖 on 𝑌𝑖𝑡 (Lee, et al., 2004).
3.2 Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design 
The sharp regression discontinuity design is a quasi-experimental approach, and the method is 
implemented in settings where subjects are either assigned to a treatment group or a control 
group, based on whether the subject is above or below a fixed threshold on a continuously 
measured scale (Smith, et al., 2017). 
𝑇𝑖 = {
 1   𝑖𝑓   𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑥0
 0   𝑖𝑓   𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥0
The variable 𝑥𝑖 is a continuous forcing variable or an assignment variable, 𝑥0 is the threshold
while 𝑇𝑖 is a binary treatment variable (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). If the observed value of a
forcing variable 𝑥𝑖 is equal to or greater than a fixed threshold 𝑥0, the subject is assigned to the
treatment group. However, if the observed value 𝑥𝑖 is less than the fixed threshold, the subject
is assigned to the control group. Thus, the treatment threshold, 𝑥0, separates the subjects into
two groups: subjects receiving the treatment (𝑇𝑖 = 1) and subjects that do not receive the
treatment (𝑇𝑖 = 0).
A key assumption when applying the regression discontinuity design is that when comparing 
the outcomes for subjects whose value of the forcing variable are just below and just above the 
fixed threshold, the subjects are assumed to be similar in all other ways, aside from the assigned 
treatment (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). This means that the treatment status will be randomized 
in a narrow window of the threshold. Thus, when comparing subjects in a narrow window on 
either side of the threshold, the difference between the subjects are likely due to the treatment. 
If for example, investments in green infrastructure are significantly higher for municipality 
councils above the threshold, it indicates that the variation is due to the discontinuity and not 
due to any other confounding factors. The assignment variable in this paper is the seat share for 
governing coalitions that either include the Environmental Party or not. The threshold used is 
50% of the seat shares in the municipal council.  
There are also two other assumptions specific to the regression discontinuity design that needs 
to be considered. Firstly, there must be a discontinuity in the probability of the treatment at the 
threshold (Smith, et al., 2017). Secondly, groups are either assigned to the treatment or not, in 
a way that is similar to randomization, meaning that the subjects have not exerted control of the 
value of the forcing variable, and therefore are unmanipulated. 
(1)
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3.3 Identification and Estimation 
The regression discontinuity method can be applied in several different ways (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2008), two approaches will be discussed below. The first approach, which is also the 
simplest, is to only compare average outcomes in a narrow window on each side of the 
threshold, and thus often only a small number of observations (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). 
However, this approach can induce a risk of an imprecise estimate, since the regression 
discontinuity method could be subject to sampling variability. The first approach therefore 
requires large sample sizes to reduce the risk of an imprecise estimate of the treatment. In 
contrast, the second approach is to use all available data and a control function, and if the control 
function is correctly specified it will yield an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. 
However, if the control function is not correctly specified, it can create a risk of bias, because 
the control function will capture any correlation between the treatment variable and the error 
term since the assignment variable is the only systematic determinant of the treatment. To 
summarize, there is a risk of sampling variability when applying the first approach and the 
second approach induces the risk of bias in the estimate of the treatment. 
Since there are 95 municipalities within ±2 percentage of the 50% threshold in the sample, 
which is a relatively small number of observations close to the threshold, the second approach 
will be the preferred method in this paper. However, the first approach will be used as a 
specification check, where data in a narrow window, [48, 52] and [45, 55], of the threshold will 
be used (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). If the control function of the second approach is correctly 
specified it will yield the same estimates as the first approach, here used as a specification 
check. To estimate the causal effect of Environmental party representation on investments in 
green infrastructure, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, at the fixed threshold 𝑥0 (e.g. 50% seat shares) the following model is
used:     
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜋𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑃)𝜑 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the outcome related to investments in green infrastructure for municipality i in time
period t (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). The regression model also contains county fixed effect 𝜇𝑖,
year fixed effect 𝜆𝑡 and a binary treatment variable 𝑇𝑖𝑡. The treatment variable adopts the value
one if the governing coalition contains the Environmental Party, and zero if the governing 
coalition does not contain the Environmental Party. The control function 
𝑓(𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑃) with various polynomial stages is also a part 
of the regression model. The treatment effect or causal effect, 𝜋, measures the average 
difference in investments in green infrastructure between the governing coalitions that contain 
respectively do not contain the Environmental Party. The fixed effects are included to improve 
the efficiency of the model, and there is no need for additional control variables, since the 
control function is sufficient in order to receive an unbiased estimate of the treatment variable. 
However, control variables (e.g. Population density and Disposable income for households) 
can be added to equation (2) as a specification check to control whether the treatment effect is 
as good as randomly assigned (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). Additional control variables should 
not affect the estimate of the treatment significantly, since the treatment effect should be as 
good as randomly assigned conditional on the control function. Further, it is not valid to 
interpret the coefficients except from the treatment effect, 𝜋, in the specified model (2).   
(2)
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4 Data 
There are 290 municipalities in Sweden, and the municipal councils play an important role both 
for the Swedish economy and in terms of allocation of functions (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). 
The local governments are responsible for i.e. education and to a great extent social welfare. 
The municipality councils have a constitutional right of self-government and have a large 
freedom to organize its activities. Other responsibilities include organizing local infrastructure, 
i.e. traffic planning, traffic safety, public transport and extensive projects within infrastructure
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting, 2019).
Every municipality has an elected council acting as the decision-making body. Elections are 
held every fourth year, and in the local elections 2014 the voter turnout was 82,8% (SCB, 2014). 
The seats in the council are proportionately distributed, based on each party’s vote share and 
based on the adjusted odd-number method (Valmyndigheten, 2019). On the national level the 
political landscape in Sweden has been divided into two wings, the left-wing and the right-
wing, but on the municipal level other variances of coalitions often occur. A political landscape 
with a Proportional Representation system and a number of small parties raise questions on 
how to define the treatment, why the Swedish electoral system need to be treated as bipartisan 
(Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). Such a simplification is necessary in order to define the treatment, 
and the treatment 𝑇𝑖 will equal one if the governing coalition contain the Environmental Party
and zero if not.  
The study exclusively focuses on whether a governing coalition include the Environmental 
Party or not, and based on that estimate the causal effect of Environmental Party representation 
on investments in green infrastructure. The Environmental Party has been chosen since they 
were the only party in the 2014 election with a clear alignment to fight environmental issues, 
who in the election manifesto claimed they wanted to increase the number of charging spots 
and make electric vehicles more accessible (Miljöpartiet, 2014). According to a report made by 
Naturskyddsföreningen, the Environmental Party were the party who promised to do most 
actions for the environment during the electoral period 2014–2018, followed by the Left Party 
and the Liberal Party (Naturskyddföreningen, 2018).    
Of 290 Swedish municipalities, the final sample used in this paper consists of the results of 
elections held in 195 municipalities the year 2014, where 94 municipalities, that are governed 
by minority coalitions are excluded because the minority coalitions cannot rule without the 
support of other parties. Moreover, one municipality has been excluded from the sample 
because all of the established parties are included in a coalition (100 % of the seat shares), thus 
an outlier. Out of the total 290 municipalities the 195 municipalities in the sample are governed 
by majority coalitions, which is required when applying a sharp Regression discontinuity 
design in this setting. Table 1 summarizes the number of local governments where the ruling 
coalition contained the Environmental Party and the ruling coalitions that did not include the 
Environmental Party, during the sample period 2014–2018.  
TABLE 1. Governing coalitions in Sweden’s local governments between 2014 and 2018. 
Election period Number of governments including the 
Environmental Party 
Number of governments not including the 
Environmental Party 
2014–2018 82 113 
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The outcomes used in the analysis are: the number of charging spots installed per population 
per unit area and the number of registered electric vehicles per population per unit area. The 
outcomes are divided by the population density, since the most populated municipalities 
probably will have more charging spots and electric vehicles than rural municipalities. The data 
set consists of monthly data for the 195 municipalities from September 2013 to January 2019. 
Only public charging spots for electrical vehicles are included, where the public can charge 
their vehicles. All registered electrical vehicles in each municipality makes the outcome 
variable. However, the registration of charging spots does not necessarily reflect the building 
pace or the registration pace. The data has been provided by Power Circle (ELIS – Elbilen i 
Sverige), which is an interest organization for the electric power industry. Table 2 presents 
summary statistics for the two outcome variables, and summary statistics for the control 
variables: population density and disposable income for households.  
TABLE 2. Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Standard deviation min max 
Outcomes 
   Charging spots1 0.021 0.365 0 26.25 
   Electrical vehicles1 0.056 0.184 0 4.545 
Assignment variable 
   Seat share 0.485 0.066 0.25 0.73 
Control Variables 
   Population density 122.1 415.8 0.30 5,139 
   Disposable income   433.5 105.4 303 1,346 
1: Charging spots per population per unit area, and Electric vehicles per population per unit area. 
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5 Results and Analysis 
In this section the causal effect of Environmental Party representation on investments in green 
infrastructure is presented and analysed. In order to perform the analysis, two approaches of the 
sharp regression discontinuity design are implemented. The first, and most preferred approach, 
is to use all available data and a control function, and then use different specification checks to 
check whether the control function in equation (2) is correctly specified or not (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2008). The second approach, to compare average outcomes in a narrow window on 
each side of the threshold, is used as a specification check. The results from the estimated 
equation (2) are presented in Table 3, where seven different specifications of equation (2) were 
estimated.  
5.1 Regression results 
In Table 3, the regressions estimated in column 1–3 uses a full sample, no control variables, 
and different polynomial stages of the control function (e.g. seat share for coalitions containing 
the Environmental Party), and in column 4–5 two control variables are added. The regressions 
estimated in the two last columns 6–7 use only observations in a neighbourhood of the 
threshold, no polynomial stages of the control function and no control variables. The outcomes, 
representing the investments in green infrastructure are transformed into logarithmic form, 
since a percentage change interpretation is preferred for the estimated causal effect (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2008). 
The first and most preferred approach of the sharp regression discontinuity design uses all 
available data and a control function in seat share, however one concern regarding the design 
is whether the control function is correctly specified or not (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). The first 
specification check is to control whether the estimate of the treatment (e.g. causal effect) is 
sensitive to the different specifications of the control function, e.g. different polynomial stages. 
The control function in equation (2) goes from a first-order to a third-order polynomial in the 
covariate seat share for coalitions containing the Environmental Party (column 1–3). The 
second specification check is to control whether the estimate of the treatment in equation (2) is 
sensitive to different specifications of the control function and added control variables (column 
4–5). Compared to column 1–3, the control variables should not affect the estimate of the 
treatment, only reduce the standard errors.     
The second approach of the sharp regression discontinuity design will be used as the final 
specification check, meaning that the causal effect is estimated by only using observations near 
the 50% threshold, and without any specification of the control function seat share (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2008). Column 6 includes observations that are ±2 percent from the threshold, and 
column 7 includes observations that are ±5 percent from the threshold. When only using 
observations close to the fixed threshold, the sample will be a close approximation to a 
randomized sample and it is therefore unnecessary to include a control function. Thus, the 
estimated causal effect of the second approach (column 6–7) should be equal to the estimates 
from the first approach (column 1–5). If there is a difference, it implies that the control function 
in seat share may be misspecified.     
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TABLE 3: Estimated causal effects 
Outcomes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Log (Charging spots)1 0.006* 0.006* 0.007* 0.009** 0.010** 0.006 0.004 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Log (Electric Vehicles)1 0.113*** 0.119*** 0.132*** 0.102*** 0.121*** 0.153** 0.101** 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.044) (0.024) (0.033) (0.059) (0.039) 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full +- 2 +- 5 
Seat share Polynomial First Second Third Second Third None None 
Controls NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1: Charging spots per population per unit area, and Electric vehicles per population per unit area 
The first row of Table 3 shows the estimated causal effect for different specifications of 
equation (2) with the outcome variable; charging spots per population per unit area. The 
estimates of the treatment in column 1–7 are quite similar to each other and ranging between 
0.004 and 0.010. Since the estimates in column 1–3 hardly changes, this implies that the 
estimated causal effect is not sensitive to the different polynomial stages of the control function, 
and when the control variables are added (column 4–5), there is just a small change of the 
estimate. Compared to column 1–3, the added control variables (column 4–5) should not affect 
the estimate of the treatment. Since the estimate hardly changes, this implies that the treatment 
(e.g. governing coalition) is in fact as good as randomly assigned. However, the inclusion of 
control variables should reduce the standard errors, but the standard errors in column 4–5 do 
not decrease (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). All estimates except for the two that uses observations 
in a narrow window of the threshold (column 6–7), are significantly different from zero at the 
5% and 10% level. When the sample is restricted to ±2 and ±5 to the 50% threshold, the 
estimated causal effect is 0.6% respectively 0.4%, which is quite similar to the other estimates 
in the first row. However, these estimates are not significantly different from zero. According 
to the first approach, municipalities where the Environmental Party are represented in the 
governing coalition have approximately 0,6 % more charging spots per population per unit area 
than municipalities where the Environmental Party is not in the governing coalition. 
The second row of Table 3 shows the estimated causal effect for different specifications of 
equation (2) with the outcome variable; electric vehicles per population per unit area. As in the 
first row, the estimates of the treatment in column 1–7 are quite similar to each other, and 
ranging between 0.10 and 0.15. The estimates in column 1–3 are quite similar which implies 
that the causal effect is not sensitive to different polynomial stages of the control function, and 
the estimate hardly changes when the control variables are added (column 4–5). The only thing 
that change is the standard errors. All estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1% 
and 5% level. When the sample is restricted to ±2 and ±5 to the 50% threshold, the estimated 
causal effect is 15% respectively 10%, which is quite similar to the other estimates in the first 
row. The standard errors in column 6–7 are larger than the standard errors in the other columns, 
which illustrates why the first approach with the control function is the preferred method. This 
shows that the first approach is more efficient than just comparing the average outcomes in a 
small neighbourhood on either side of the treatment threshold (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). Since 
all the estimates are quite similar after applying a number of specification checks it suggests 
that the estimated causal effect is unbiased, and according to the first approach municipalities 
where the Environmental Party are represented in the governing coalition have approximately 
10% more electric vehicles per population per unit area than municipalities where the 
Environmental Party is not in the governing coalition.  
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5.2 Graphical Analysis 
The results in Table 3 indicates that there is a positive estimate of the treatment in all of the 
different specifications of equation (2), an increase ranging from 0.4%–1% for charging spots 
and 10%–15% for electric vehicles when the governing coalition include the Environmental 
Party. Another way to distinguish the effect of Environmental Party representation on outcomes 
reflecting investments in green infrastructure is to analyse equation (2) graphically. Figure 1–2 
plots the number of charging spots divided by the population per unit area (logarithmic form) 
against the seat share for coalitions containing the Environmental Party, and Figure 3–4 plots 
the number of electric vehicles divided by the population per unit area (logarithmic form) 
against the same forcing variable. 
Each dot in Figure 1–4 is an average of the number of charging spots/electric vehicles in a 
municipality during the electoral period (2014–2018). The vertical line in the middle of the 
graphs marks the 50% threshold. Municipalities to the right are governed by coalitions that 
include the Environmental Party after the 2014 election, while municipalities to the left are 
governed by coalitions that do not include the Environmental Party after the 2014 election. The 
continuous line in the graphs is the predicted number of charging spots/electric vehicles from 
equation (2), which include a second-order polynomial in seat share for coalitions that include 
the Environmental Party and a binary variable equal to one for observations above the 50% 
threshold. In Figure 1 and 3 the whole sample is used. However, in Figure 2 and 4 only 
observations close to the threshold, [45,55], are applied. According to the results stated in Table 
3, there should be a discontinuity at the threshold, and there is indeed a jump in Figure 1–4 for 
both the number of charging spots and electric vehicles at the 50% threshold.  
The difference between the estimated treatment effect at the 50% threshold for charging spots 
per population per unit area appears to be about 0.7% higher in municipalities where the 
governing coalition contain the Environmental Party. This seems to be the case both when 
applying the whole sample size and when applying only observations in a narrow window of 
the threshold. This implies that the estimated treatment effect for the outcome variable charging 
spots per population per unit area has more or less the same estimate in Table 3 and in the 
graphical results in Figure 1–2. The difference between the estimated treatment effect at the 
50% threshold for electric vehicles per population per unit area appears to be about 0.7% when 
the whole sample size is used, and about 5% when only observations in a narrow window of 
the threshold are applied. This implies that the treatment effect in the graphical result for the 
outcome variable electric vehicles per population per unit area is less than when the estimate of 
the treatment in Table 3.   
As is shown in Figure 1–4 the regression line is downward sloping to the right of the threshold, 
which may have to do with the bargaining power within the coalitions. One can argue that the 
Environmental Party in governing coalitions close to the 50% threshold, have a greater 
bargaining power than in governing coalitions where the coalition has, for example, 60% of the 
seats in the local council.  This could explain the decrease of installed charging and registered 
electric vehicles when the governing coalition has a greater support. According to Folke (2014), 
the estimated causal effect of party representation on policy outcome has to do with more than 
being represented in the governing coalition, instead the effects can likely be explained by 
changes in coalition bargaining power since small parties’ trade support for larger parties in 
some matters in exchange for support in their policies.     
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FIGURE 1: The effect of Environmental Party representation on charging spots when using the whole sample 
FIGURE 2: The effect of Environmental Party representation on charging spots using only observations in a narrow window 
FIGURE 3: The effect of Environmental Party representation on electric vehicles when using the whole sample 
FIGURE 4: The effect of Environmental Party representation on electric vehicles using only observations in a narrow 
window 
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6 Discussion 
In this section the estimated results and its relation to existing literature will be discussed, 
followed by a discussion of the validity of the regression discontinuity design.  
6.1 Results 
The estimate of the different specifications of equation (2) is presented in Table 3. The results 
of the preferred approach, using a control function and the whole data set, implies that there is 
an increase of charging spots per population per unit area of approximately 0.6% when the 
governing coalition contains the Environmental Party, compared to municipalities where the 
governing coalition do not contain the Environmental Party. The estimated causal effect when 
using all available data and a control function is quite similar to the estimated causal effect 
where only data in a narrow window on each side of the threshold is applied. This should imply 
that the estimated causal effect is an unbiased estimate. However, the estimated causal effect, 
when applying data in a narrow window of the threshold, is not significantly different from 
zero. This implies that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, meaning that there is no difference 
between the average outcomes in municipalities where the governing coalition contains the 
Environmental Party or not. This would make sense since the estimated causal effect of 
Environmental Party representation on the outcome charging spots is relatively small, 0.6%. 
Further, there is an increase of electric vehicles per population per unit area of approximately 
11% when the governing coalition contain the Environmental Party. The application of different 
specification checks of equation (2) show that the results are quite reliable, since the estimates 
are quite similar and significantly different from zero, which suggests that the estimated causal 
effect is an unbiased.  
However, the results show a considerably larger increase of registered electric vehicles than 
charging spots in municipalities where the Environmental Party is represented in the governing 
coalition. Since the estimated causal effect on the outcome variable charging spots per 
population per unit area is quite small, this could indicate that there are other factors that drives 
the increase of registered electric vehicles. Thus, there is reason to question the validity of the 
results regarding the causal effect of Environmental Party representation on the number of 
registered electric vehicles.  
In previous studies, researchers have used the regression discontinuity design to estimate the 
causal effect of political representation on policy outcomes. Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) and 
Folke (2014) have both applied data sets based on the results of Swedish local elections to 
estimate party effect on economic and fiscal policy, respectively fiscal policy, immigration and 
environmental policy. However, they use different approaches of the regression discontinuity 
design, where Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) treats the Swedish electoral system as bipartisan while 
Folke (2014) develops a new methodology originating from the regression discontinuity design. 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) find a causal effect of party representation on economic and fiscal 
policy, while Folke find a causal effect of party representation on immigration and 
environmental policy. The results of this study show that there probably is a causal effect of 
party representation on investments in green infrastructure, and are thus consistent with 
previous research based on Swedish data. The outcome investments in green infrastructure are 
connected to outcomes regarding environmental policy, which makes it interesting to compare 
the results of this study to the study by Folke (2014). However, the environmental outcome in 
the study by Folke (2014) is an approximation of environmental policy based on environmental 
ranking, rather than a measurable and factual outcome such as the number of charging spots 
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and electric vehicles. A conclusion made by Folke (2014) that may also affect the results of this 
study, is that the inclusion of small single issue parties in governing coalitions may affect the 
positive causal effect to a greater extent than including parties with a wider political agenda.  
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) has shown that party representation in the U.S. at a local level 
does not affect policy outcomes. Although it is difficult to speculate on why there is such a 
difference between the results based on Swedish respectively U.S. data sets, one possible factor 
may be that there are a number of fundamental differences between the two countries political 
systems. One fundamental difference is that the system in the U.S. is bipartisan while the 
Swedish political system consists of a number of parties, but is treated as bipartisan in this study 
and in the study by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008).   
6.2 Limitations 
This study, however, has its limitations. In the method section, three key assumptions of the 
regression discontinuity design were presented. To support the validity of the estimated causal 
effects, it is crucial to assess the validity of these assumptions, two of which are empirically 
testable (Smith, et al., 2017). The first assumption is that there should be a discontinuity in the 
probability of the treatment at the threshold. The second assumption is that the municipals’ 
value of the seat share was not manipulated, meaning that groups are either assigned to the 
treatment or not, in a way that is similar to randomization and that the subjects have not exerted 
control of the value of the forcing variable. 
The validity of the first assumption can easily be tested. If the assumption is valid, the treatment 
will equal one for every unit of the forcing variable that is equal to or above the threshold, and 
the treatment will equal zero for every unit of the forcing variable below the threshold (Smith, 
et al., 2017). In this case, when the treatment is equal to one, the vote shares range from 0.5 to 
0.73, and when the treatment is equal to zero the seat shares range from 0.25 to 0.49. This 
means, that the first assumption is valid for this sample. To control the validity of the second 
assumption, a histogram of density of the forcing variable seat share for coalitions containing 
the Environmental Party was created. The density in Figure 5 is not flat, which is an indication 
of discontinuity of the forcing variable, meaning that the forcing variable may be manipulated. 
This violates the assumption that groups (e.g. governing coalitions) are assigned to the 
treatment in a way that is as good as randomly assigned, and this in turn violates the 
exchangeability assumption.  
FIGURE 5: Density for the forcing variable seat share for coalitions containing the Environmental Party 
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One possible explanation could be that coalitions with a support just below the 50% threshold 
may actively choose to include the Environmental Party, in order to get a majority in the 
council. Thus, parties can choose to include the Environmental Party or not depending on, 
among others, how green they are, in order to obtain a majority in the council. For example, in 
the municipality Uppsala, the Liberal Party, Centre Party and the Social democrats combined 
have 49% of the seat shares in the local council, and to get the majority in the council they have 
chosen to include the Environmental Party. In contrast, in the close by municipality Knivsta, 
the Liberal Party, Centre Party and the Social democrats did also receive 49% of the seat shares 
in the council but have, however, chosen not to include the Environmental Party but the Left 
Party, in order to get a majority in the council. This means that one determinant of whether the 
Environmental Party is included in the governing coalition or not is how green the other parties 
are in each municipality, which can in turn affect local investments in green infrastructure.       
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7 Conclusion 
The aim of the study has been to examine to what extent investments in green infrastructure are 
affected by Environmental Party representation at a local level, and the objective has been to 
estimate the causal effect of Environmental Party representation in governing coalitions on 
investments in green infrastructure. The results show that there probably is a positive causal 
effect of Environmental Party representation on outcomes reflecting investments in green 
infrastructure, using a sharp regression discontinuity design. The results are supported by 
various specification checks. However, one of the key assumptions of the regression 
discontinuity design, namely that the governing coalitions of the municipalities value of the 
forcing variable should not be manipulated, has been violated. Thus, the governing coalitions 
are probably not as good as randomly assigned. This makes it hard to draw any conclusions of 
the estimated causal effect of Environmental Party representation on investments in green 
infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, the results can be of interest when evaluating the vision of the Environmental 
Party’s 2014 election manifesto, to increase the number of charging spots, and thereby also 
making electric vehicles more accessible, since the results suggest that there is a causal effect 
of Environmental Party representation on investments promoting electric vehicle infrastructure. 
The graphical results, however, show that there are less charging spots and electric vehicles in 
municipalities where the governing coalition including the Environmental Party have a greater 
seat share, i.e. 60% of the seat share. The same applies for the governing coalitions where the 
Environmental Party is not represented. The largest number of charging spots per population 
per unit area are in the municipalities where the governing coalitions have a support close to 
the 50% threshold, i.e. in municipalities where the governing coalition that include the 
Environmental Party barely won. It can therefore be hard to distinguish if it is the 
Environmental Party that drives the development of green infrastructure, since we are unaware 
of the Environmental Party’s bargaining power within the governing coalition. This indicates 
that other factors, such as bargaining power, need to be considered when assessing the causal 
effect of Environmental Party representation on investments in green infrastructure. 
A suggestion for further research in the field of studying the causal effect of political 
representation on investments in green infrastructure is therefore to include other factors, such 
as bargaining power and to further develop the methodology developed by Folke (2014), which 
in some ways better reflect the Swedish political system. 
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